Weekly Mational Intelligencer.

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Weekly National Intelligencer.

BY GALES & SEATON. JAMES C. WELLING, ASSOCIATE EDITOR. The subscription price of this paper for a year is Two DOLLARS, payable in advance.

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AN ENGINEER TURNED PAMPHLETEER.

A few months ago General J. G. BARNARD, of the United States Corps of Engineers, published a small volume entitled "The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents, as developed by the Report of Major General George B. Mc-Clellan and other Public Documents." It purported to be a "review" of that campaign, but in reality it was a coarse and malignant personal attack on the military reputation of Gen. McClellan. When he wrote his "review" Gen. Barnard was only a Brigadier General of Volunteers. Since the publication of his "review" he has been made a Mojor General of Volunteers. Sic itur

ad astra. We have said that Gen. Barnard's work is coarse and malignant personal attack on Gen. Mc-Clellan. It certainly is not the treatise of a soldier who respects his profession or of a gentleman who respects the amenities of discussion. In it Gen. McClellan is charged with "mismangement in the face of the enemy," with "culpable negligence," with "more than childish levity and obstinacy." with "having forfeited every claim to generalship even of the most indifferent character," and as if these reflections on the professional character of his former commander (for whom he one professed a warm admiration and friendship) could not satisfy his lust of defamation, Gen. Barnard undertakes to impeach the truthfulness and candor of Gen. McClellan's report by levelling with his "professional" opinion given at the time. against it the grossest accusations, as where, for Gen. McClellan having stated in his report that the spring and summer of 1862, he was compelled instance, he charges Gen. McClellan with resorting to an "unworthy subterfuge," (p. 20,) with "stultifying his own conclusions," (p. 21,) with falsifications which bear "the stamp of disingenuous afterthought, (p. 25,) and other such dishonorable imputations.

It will be seen that this writer is fluent in crimination, if not cogent in the evidence by which he sustains his charges. What adds to the wantonness of his charges is the statement by which they are prefaced, when at the threshold of his volume Gen. Barnard, in speaking of his relations with Gen. McClellan, does not scruple to write, "with no man have I ever, with a more absolute freedom from any other feeling than one of personal kindness, been so long closely associated, and if, at any moment, there seemed to me to exist any slight grounds for complaint, they were never such as to be remembered or to have any abiding place in my breast."

When this " review," thus reeking with personal vilification of the commander under whom he had served, and with whom he had so "long been closely associated," first came under our notice, we gave to its contents a careful perusal, because we were told that the political enemies of Gen. McClellan designed to use it for the purpose of helping to "kill him off" as a candidate for the Presidency, first before the Chicago Convention, and secondly, in case of his nomination, before the people. As the result of our perusal we very naturally came to the conclusion, as every intelligent reader would easily infer, that such a farrage of calumnious insinuation and vituperation could injure nobody but the writer.

It seems, however, that the Republican "Executive Congressional Committee," appointed to direct the operations of the pending Presidential contest from this city, have judged that the contents of this volume, in spite of its garbage -- perhaps they were attracted by its noisome odor-have judged that it furnishes materials good enough for popular use as "a campaign document," and the "review" of Gen. Barnard has therefore been condensed for their use, by his own or some other serviceable hand. into a political pamphlet, which they are disseminating throughout the country, in order, if possible, to poison the popular mind. The bane carries with it a sufficient antidote in the very virulence of its nature and in the exaggeration of its measure, as large doses of certain poisons are said sometimes to neutralize their deleterious tendencies sume to make it a reproach to Gen. McClellan that by the very excess in which they are administered. he preferred to reduce these works by siege rather But since the "review" of Gen. Barnard is daily finding its way in the shape of "a campaign docu- read in the closing words of this same report, writment" to multitudes who may not be apprized of ten on the 6th of May, 1862, when the siege had its character, or the character of its writer, it may just closed, and when besides, its events being fresh be worth while, in the cause of historical truth as in his mind, he had no motive to misrepresen well as of political fairness, to place both in their them. He then wrote: true aspect before the public.

As this work professes to treat on "the Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents," it will be interesting to know what are some of the "antecedents" of this Gen. Barnard which qualify him for the task of slandering General McClellan. neer of the Army of the Potomac while it was un- inferences as readily as we can state them. der the command of Gen. McClellan, during the cribed to him in his profession, was naturally such expressed very different opinions on the spot."

in particular directions. Gen. McClellan, it seems, Gen. Barnard in forming his conclusions, and for conveys as it is fine in point of expression. thus trusting him this officer now charges Gen. McClellan with nothing less than manifest incapacity. He appears to think that Gen. McClellan should have known at the time that his advice No accounts being kept for this paper, it will not be sent to any one unless paid for in advance, nor anylonger than not have been allowed any weight in deciding the time for which it is paid.

was utterly worthless, and, that as such it should a great blund or the omission to open our batteries. But the time for which it is paid.

was utterly worthless, and, that as such it should a great blund or the omission to open our batteries. But the time for which it is paid.

For instance, in his "review," Gen. Barnard imputes it as a fault to Gen. McClellan that he allowed "the blockade of the Potomac" to take place and to endure during the winter of 1861-62. He omits to state that it was partly by his advice, given in his profassional character as an engineer, that the attempt to dislodge the enemy from his positions on the Potomac was not made. To this effect he wrote :

"The operation involves the forcing of a very strong ne of defence of the enemy, and all that we would have "The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by landing on Freestone point. With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied that it involves a risk of failure. Should we, then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not."

So also Gen. Barnard complains in his "review' that Gen. McClellan did not order an immediate at tack of the enemy's works at Yorktown when he arrived before them early in April, 1862. "As to the propriety of assaulting these lines," he now says. if there ever was a case in which such a step was not merely justifiable and advisable, but demanded by the circumstances, it was surely this." All chances of the success of the campaign, he says, "turned upon not being delayed at Yorktown." In his "official report," written under occurrence of the event in question, he advances the same opinion. But in this political "review" he denies, what in his official report he admits, that the decision of Gen. McClellan not to order an immediate attack was made in concurrence tical pamphlet that he "believes there must be some | ment under the disfavor of our military authorities. error in that assertion," (p. 22,) forgetting that every honest inquirer for truth, by turning to page trand, under the author's superintendence, would be able to read as follows :

"However I may be committed to any expression of pro-fessional opinion to the contrary, (I certainly did suggest it,) my opinion now is that the lines of Yerktown should have been assaulted."

It will thus be seen that Gen. Barnard here acsays, "there must be some error in the assertion' of Gen. McClellen that he gave such an opinion. The reader can easily perceive where the "error"

In order to expose the utter recklessness and against reducing the enemy's works at Yorktown by a siege rather than by an assault, and in then blaming Gen. McClellan for taking the former readers to the following extract from his official report, made to Gen. Totten under date of May 6. 1862. We quote from the report as published by Van Nostrand, under the author's supervision,

"The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times. The country on both sides of the War wick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have continually had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line, and the difficulty of handling our forces, (owing to the impracticable character of the country,) to do so. If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of Yorktown, the enemy's lines were no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations, and the result was in my mind a certainty. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by as

And with what face this engineer can now pre than by a direct and immediate assault may be

"The forcing of such line with so little loss is, in itse an exploit less brilliant, perhaps, but more worthy of study than would have been a murderous assault, even if it has

Now, let this language, written by Gen. Barnard in May, 1862, under the sanction of his official character, be compared with the language held in He was, it will be remembered, the Chief Engi- his "review," and the reader can draw his own

Col Lecomte, of the Swiss army, who served winter of 1861-'62, and during the whole of the through the Peninsula campaign on the staff of the Peninsular campaign. While acting in this ca- Army of the Potomac, in referring to the selfpacity he was necessarily entrusted by Gen. Me- contradictions of this officer, says: "We are Olellan with large responsibilities, and the advice the more astonished at this retrospective confiwhich in this capacity he gave to his commander, if believed to be inspired by the intelligence astronomy of the engineers who were with him, and he himself, cribed to him in his profession, was naturally such constrained at this retrospective constrained to the more astonished at this retrospective constrained at this retrospecti advice as would largely influence the determina. What will be the "astonishment" of this gallant tion of Gen. McClellan. The commander must officer when he learns that Gen. Barnard now denies because we intend to weigh them in the balances perforce depend on his chief engineer for much that he ever expressed any such opinion, though he and mark them according to the degree in which

conduct in critical questions that relate to the 1863, that he had previously "committed" himpracticability or expediency of military movements | self professions ally on the subject against the "retrospective cor ifidence" he then entertained, to use relied semetimes upon the professional opinions of the phrase of (Jol. Lecomte, as keen in the satire it

Nor is this the only specimen of Gen. Barnard's "retro spective" sagacity. In his official report, writter i in the year 1863, after Gen. Mc-Clellan's reme val from command, he designates as

"The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened ou r batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. The effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors; and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate for regularital reasons."

When he vess under examination by the "War Committee" on the 25th of February, 1863-s month after t he date of his official report-Gen. Barnard expl ained the origin of this blunder as follows. We quote from Vol. I. of the War Committee's report, p. 393:

"Question. Why were not our batteries opened as fast as completed?
"Gen. Barn. ard. The idea was to a produce more com-

"Gen. BARN. tRD. The idea was to a produce more com-plete effect when they were opened.

"Question. Whose idea was that?

"Gen. BARN ARD. I cannot say. I suppose the error of not doing it belongs as much to me as to any body else. The idea was to get the batteries all ready, and produce a decisive effect sit once when they should be opened."

The reader is now prepared to appreciate how much weight should be given to the accusations of this military engineer turned political reviewer. If the Commanding General erred in the course he pursued on certain occasions, it was perhaps because he gave too much weight to the counsels of his chief engineer at the only time when those counsels could possibly be of any use to him in determining his military conduct. It may be that date of January 27, 1863, nearly a year after the Gen. McClellan overrated the capacity of Gen. Barnard. It is certain that Gen. Barnard thinks so, for he blames Gen. McClellan most vehemently | York World,) a letter in which he held the followfor taking his advice when he should have known better than to do so. It undoubtedly was a grievous misfortune to Gen. McClellan that in the conduct of his military operations on the Peninsula, during the Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac to follow the advice of Gen. Barnard, as given at had "expressed the judgment that those works the time from day to day, rather than the pluperfect could not with any reasonable certainty be carried wisdom contained in his report written in the year by assault," Gen. Barnard now writes in his poli- 1868, after Gen. McClellan had gone into retire-

We have thus sufficiently exposed the palpable contradictions which exist between the "profes-62 of his official report as printed by Van Nos. sional opinions" of Gen. Barnard as compared with his "official report," published in January, 1863. after Gen. McClellan had been removed from command, with no probability of his restoration to favor under the present Administration, and still more as compared with his "campaign document" disseminated by the Republican Executive Comknowledges himself to have been committed by his mittee in this city. The exhibition we have made 'professional opinion" (given at the time) against is a sad one, but it was necessary to the vindica the expediency of making an assault on the enemy's tion of truth and to the defence of our recent mililines at Yorktown. In his "review," now disse- tary history from perversions having their origin minated as a political document, he denies that he in political rancor, and obviously inspired by comever gave such an opinion. In the year 1862 he plaisance towards official superiors who have favors says he did give such a "professional opinion" but to grant and promotions to bestow. How far such that it was an erroneous one. In the year 1864 he political rancor and such complaisance have given color and complexion to the views of Gen. Barnard the reader shall judge for himself from the evidence we have already advanced and from that which we next proceed to adduce.

In the preface of the "review" containing this falsity of the representation which Gen. Barnard gross personal attack on the private as well as the now makes in first denying that he ever advised military character of his former commander, Gen. Barnard writes as follows, after alluding to the disheartened condition of our affairs on the 1st of January, 1863, when the Army of the Potomac course, we need but invite the attention of our had just been led by Gen. Burnside to unavailing slaughter at Fredericksburg:

> "Men did not feel dismayed because they doubted the ability of the nation to carry on the struggle to a successful issue, but because, for the time, the power of the nation was partially paralyzed. Yet there never was a moment when the public safety, and the safety of the common cause more urgently demanded the exertion of all the nation's strength. Why, then, did men doubt? Where was the origin of this paralysis? It was in the charge, audacionsly made, impudently persisted in that to the blunders and in capacity of the Administration all our disasters were due that with such incapacity at the head of affairs our resou ces, though they were poured forth like water, would, like scater, too, be spill on the ground. Men will sacrifice much in great emergencies, but they never will give their lives ey merely that such treasures may be igno

"Had McClellan but had his way, had he not been in-terfered with; had not his army been reduced and taken away from him, and his movements in a thousand ways hampered and balked; had he, in short, had the sole control of military affairs, all would have been different. Richmond would have been ours, the rebellion would have been subdued, and, instead of disaster and prolonged war, a

triumphant peace might have been our happier lot.' ... "The Administration thus denounced was, for better worse, the constituted agency through which the war, if it were to be carried on at all, must be conducted. That cannot be altered. The men who weakened the arm of the nation's sole war making power just to that degree endangered the nation's cause. Therefore the question of andangered the nation's cause. Therefore the question of Gen. McClellan's responsibility for the disasters ceased to be a mere abstract question about which men might differ without prejudice to the public interests; it became a national question, and one of vast import.

national question, and one of vast import.

"It voas under such circumstances that, in writing an official report, at the request of Gen. McClellan himself, of the engineering operations of the Army of the Potomac, I deemed it my duty to state what I believed to be the sources of failure of the campaign of the Peninsula. The opinions therein written down were no afterthoughts. Six months before I had formed them, and when I spoke at all, (which I did not do openty,) expressed them. I had formed them painfully, reluctantly, at a period when political questions had not become involved with this subject, and no such causes existed to influence in any manner my judgment. It causes existed to influence in any manner my judgment. It was at a period when for Gen. McClellan I entertained the warmest personal regard—a feeling which I distinctly and sincerely expressed in writing on leaving him in August, 1862. With no man have I ever, with a more absolute freedom from any other feeling than one of personal aindness, been so long closely associated, and if, at any moment, there seemed to me to exist some slight grounds for complaint, they were never such as to be remembered, or to have any abiding place in my breast.

"But there are cases in which personal feelings mus-be allowed little weight. The destinies of nations canno be trifled with, and in all that affects them convictions o

We wish the reader to analyze these statements. special information that shall be decisive of his has confessed, in his official report of January 27, they shall be seen to correspond with the truth.

And there shall be no dispute about the equity of our judgments, for Gen. Barnard shall furnish both the scales and the weights used in our inquiry.

The statements, then, which he here makes are as follows: That the charge which was commonly made at the opening of the year 1863 to the effect that the Administration was responsible for the disasters that had befallen our arms in Virginia and elsewhere was a charge " audaciously made and impudently persisted in ;" that thus and then to denounce the Administration for "incapacity at the head of affairs" was not only "audacious" and "impudent," but impolitic and unpatriotic, beside being false, because the Administration was the constituted organ through which the war was to be carried on if at all, and to assail it on such grounds was "to weaken the arm of the nation's sole war-making power;" that it was under such circumstances and with such impressions that he wrote his "official report," differing so essentially from his "professional opinions" given in the field during the campaign; that the opinions written down in his "official report," though thus contrary to his "professional opinions given" on the field during the campaign, were " no afterthoughts," but that he had formed and expressed the same opinions six months before the date of that report, and that therefore, whatever may have been the "circumstances" under which the official report was written, he had formed the opinions avowed in it at a period "when political questions had not become involved with this subject."

We proceed to examine each of these averments. and that we may do so in a way to which General Barnard can interpose no objection, we beg to remind our readers that in the month of December. 1862, only a few weeks before writing his official report, Gen. Barnard addressed to Mr. WILLIAM HENRY HURLBERT, of New York city, the translator of the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville. (and then, we believe, connected with the New ing emphatic language. The letter may be found in the New York World of January 17, 1863:

14 The officers who have gone over to the South were Southerners by birth. While they have maintained their own at the Academy, in the service, and in the various fields of warfare to which our little army has been called, there was not afforded by their career or reputation the east ground for attributing to them military or scientific superiority.
"Their part in this war, considered in a purely military

point of view, has been far the easiest. Their Government has been a despotism, over which popular will or popular esprice had no sway, and the head of the Government and of the military forces have been essentially one and

." Their part in this warfare has been a defensive one-Their part in this warfare has been a defensive one—a part which has given them incalculable advantages. Occupying a central position, and possessing in their railroads (built mainly by Northern capital) great facilities for concentration, they have had but to wait until our plans were developed and put in execution, and then, owing to the enormous hindrances arising from our necessarily imperfect organization and discipline, and the difficulties of the country in which we must operate, they have been able deliberately to prepare their ground and to concentrate all their means to receive us.

"It is probable that armies of such magnitude were

" It is probable that armies of such magnitude were never before (in modern times) opposed to each other in a country so wooded and of such impassable roads as that in which has been our theatre of war, and none but those who have experienced them can well appreciate the enornous advantages which these circumstances confer upon the defence—the difficulties thrown upon the offensive. In the recent campaign against Richmond it may be said that we never saw the army to which we were opposed, nor could we judge with any approach to accuracy where it was and how disposed. Hence the hesitation in attacking an enemy whose numbers and dispositions are unknown. In place of the unity of purpose and iron will in execution which have been the advantage of the Confederate military operations, we have been permitted to have no single will to rule, no unity of plan or purpose. Not only does this apply to the direction of military operations, but even to the objects of the war, to the appointment of the Generals to command. Political or sectional influences have disturbed our counsels or frustrated our plans. The army of General McClellan was no sooner pushed into the field than it was divided under five different commanders, each independent

If we have seen no indication as yet of that commandselled, create unity of action and give room for skill in execution, (qualities certainly possessed by the head of the rebel Government.) we should at least remember Napo-leon's aphorism, that one bad General is better than two good ones, independent of each other, and acting in the same theatre of war."

Thus wrote Gen. Barnard in the month of Desember, 1862, a few weeks before he wrote his official report, which bears date January 27, 1863. Now, let us compare these statements with those contained in that report, and still more particularly with the averments made in his "review," which is now circulating as a campaign document.

The first averment, then, which he makes in the preface of the latter, is that the charge so common at the opening of the year 1863, to the effect that the Administration was responsible for the disasters that had befallen our arms in Virginia and elsewhere, was a charge "audaciously made" and "impudently persisted in." The reader will observe that in his letter to Mr. Hurlbert, written at this very period, Gen. Barnard had the audacity to make this very charge. " Political or sectional influences," he THEN said, "have disturbed our counsels or frustrated our plans."

The second averment, contained in the preface to his review, is that those who complained of the Administration for "incapacity at the head of affairs" were criminal in their want of patriotism, because they weakened the arm of the nation's sole war-making power." Gen. Barnard, in his letter Mr. Hurlbert, made this very complaint, and actually had the impudence to institute a comparison between Mr. Lincoln and Jeff. Davis, to the disadvantage of the former, tracing our want of success to the want of "unity of action and skill in execution"-"qualities," he suggests, "certainly possessed by the head of the rebel Govern-

Gen. Barnard avers in his review that he wrote his official report under date of January 27, 1863, with certain impressions which we see he did not entertain a few weeks before, when he wrote to Mr. Hurlbert, giving an entirely different explanation of our military failures, in the fact that our Generals were not left "untrammelled" by the President, and that their "plans" were "frustrated by political or sectional influences."

Gen. Barnard further avers in his review that the opinions written down in his official report

thoughts," but that he had formed and expressed them six months before that date. We see, then, that, if he had "formed" such opinions six months previously to January 27, 1863, his attack on the Administration, contained in his letter to Mr. Hurlbert, written in December, 1862, was as gratuitous as it was false, because it places him in the attitude of making charges which he now says he then felt to be so unjust that they could only be "impudently made."

In view of such transparent contradictions every reader must come to the conclusion that the testimony of General Barnard can hereafter be held credible only against himself. His memory has such a lack of tenacity (to use no stronger expression) that he cannot hold his mind to a consistent statement of any transaction he is called to resite under different circumstances. What wonder that he has been abduced by an eminent citizen as a melancholy examtle of those who "fail to speak their honest convictions where they have reason to suppose their undisguised convictions will give offence to men in power?" In his "review" he replies to this charge of having shaped his official report to please the War Committee by saying that he was "unconscious that such a committee yet existed when he wrote the

By thus over-laboring the point he would seek to stablish Gen. Barnard produces on the mind of his reader an impression directly contrary to what he wishes. He forgets that there is a legal presumption against men, quando se nimis purgitant. If he had simply denied the impeachment of his candor such denial might have pessed for what it was worth as a set-off against the insinuation of his critic. But when he asks us to accept his disclaimer on the ground that when he wrote his offial report in January, 1863, he was not conscious hat the War Committee was still in existence he greatly impairs the credibility of his affirmation by ver-taxing our credulity. Not conscious in January, 1863, that the War Committee still existed? Then we venture to say he was the only man of any intelligence in the country who was unconscious of the fact. For it was on the 20th of Deember, 1862, that the War Committee, acting under a solemn resolution of both Houses of Congress, proceeded to Fredericksburg to inquire into the disaster of the preceding 13th of that month. And it was a week or two later that the War Committee spread before the country the result of their inquiries into that terrible blunder The bureau of engineers was deeply interested in the result of their investigations, and yet General Barnard would have us believe that when he wrote his official report on the 27th of January, 1863, in the very shadow of these investigations and publications by the War Committee, he "was un-

conscious that the War Committee yet existed !" The mimie queen in the play of Hamlet ex-

Nor earth to me give food nor heaven light! Sport and repose lock from me, day and night! To desperation turn my trust and hope! And anchor's cheer in prison be my scope, Each opposite that blanks the face of joy Meet what I would have well, and it destroy Both here, and hence, pursue me lasting strife if once a widow, ever I be wife."

But though this vow of constancy was so "deeply sworn," it did not produce upon the auditors the desired impression, if we may judge from the colloguy with which Shakespeare accompanies the vehement asseveration:

" Hamlet-Madame, how like you this play ? " Queen - The lady doth protest too much, methinks. If Gen. Barnard had said that he wrote his report "out of his own mind," we might have crelited the statement, but when he says that in writing it he "was unconscious the War Committee yet existed," he makes a claim on our "retrospecive confidence" which we are only the less disposed to honor because he "protests too much."

And here we leave this hapless engineer, in his double capacity of military reviewer and political pamphleteer. He meditated, doubtless, by his unworthy assault on the military reputation of Gen. McClellan, nothing less than the injury of that officer in the popular esteem; but this is not the first instance in which those who meditate assassination succeed only in committing suicide. And, as in olden times, under the stern rule of the English common law, the felo de se was buried on the highway, with a stake run through his body, we have thought it no more than just to impale this offender with the shaft of truth, that all may see in the nature of his punishment the quality of

THANKSGIVING.

We learn that the President of the United States has issued a proclamation appointing the last Thursday of November next as a day which he desires to be observed as a day of thanksgiving. This is the day usually set apart for that purpose by the Governors of the different States, and we doubt not it will be generally observed now, as in former vears.

Admiral Porter communicates to the Navy Department the capture of the steamer Nando, a blockade-rupper of six hundred tons, with a cargo consisting of 550 bales of cotton. The capture was made by the United States steamer Fort Jackson.

The next number of the North American Review will appear under new auspices, and will bear the imprint of Ticknor & Fields, that well-known firm having assumed its publication for the future. The editorial management will be unchanged-Mr. Norton and Mr. Lowell retaining the positions they now fill.

The following is reported by Capt. Harrison, Gen. White's brigade inspector, as a schedule of property and prisoners captured by the Second Brigade, brevet Brigadier Gen. Devin commanding, (of the First Cavalry Division, Brigadier General Merritt commanding,) in the battle near Strasburg, Virginia, October 19, 1864: 22 pieces of artillery, 8 caissons, 30 ambulances, 29 army wagons, 117 horses, 143 mules, 2 stands of colors, 1 guidon, under date of January 27, 1863, were "no after- 353 prisoners, and a large number of small arms.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

SPEECH OF HON. ROBERT C. WINTHROP. AT NEW LONDON, (OT.) FOR A CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION.

We learn that the largest political meeting over held in New London (Conn.) was convened in that city on Tuesday evening, to listen to an address from the Hen. ROBERT C. WINTHROP, of Massachusetts. Lawrence Hall, in which the meeting was held, was crowded to its utmost capacity, and numbers were unable to obtain entrance. After the meeting had been organized, the Hon ABIEL CONVERSE, who was appointed to preside, introduced the speaker of the evening by the following brief speech :

Fellow citizens, we are to night honored with the prasence of a distinguished gentleman who naturally turns to New Loudon as the birthplace of his father, and the home of a long line of ancestors; a gentleman whose elegant culture and enlightened states manabip have made him a culture and enlightened statesumable have made him a national, nay, a world wide reputation; a gentleman who in the better days of the Republic was a leading spirit in the national Whig party; a gentleman who to-night stands with us shoulder to shoulder in the ranks of the only constitutional and Union party of the country, [applause] — he party who proposes to place in the Presidential files George B. McClellan. [Applause] Fellow-out rans, allow me to present to you the Hon. Robert C. Winthrop.

MR. WINTHROP'S SPEECH. Mr. WINTHROP was greated with applause as he rose

n the platform, and proceeded to speak as follows: FELLOW-CITIZENS: I am deeply sensible to the kindness and the compliment of this reception. I thank you for this inspiring welcome to your city. I have come at your request to address you on the great subject which is uppermost in all our minds and in all our hearts. I am to appeal to no prejudices or passions. North of the state can meet the exignucies of this hour. If I were ever capable of hem, I abandon and discard them all to night. I am here colly from a deep sense of the duty which rests upon each one of us to contribute what we can, by word or by deed, for a suffering, bleeding country. Compelled,

by engagements or by my health, to re use a bu dred other invitations, I could not resist the appear which was made to me from New London. And if any word of mine may be thought worthy of being latened to or regarded, in Connecticut or elsewhere, there is no place from which it may more fitly go forth than from this old and hoored home of my fathers. [Applane]

It is a time, I am aware, my friends, when the best and wisest and most patriotic men may differ and do differ widely from each other. I would cast no reproaches upon

my opposents. I do not forget the reproaches walch bave been cast upon myself from some quarters, but I have no heart for bandying personalities at a period like this I pass by all such matters as unworthy of a moment's co-si-deration. Or rather let me say they pass by me like the idle wind. The air, indeed, is full of them. z rbitcary and arrogant assumptions of superior patrionsm and mystry—coarse and malicious representations and imputations—op-probrious and insulting names and epithets, often applied by men who might well be conscious that nobudy des rves them so much as themselves—the air is full of them. They come swarming up from stump and rostrum and press and platform. We meet them at every tura. Let us not re-tort them. Let us not resent them. Let no one by any means be tempted or provoked by them into ac s of ven-geance or violence. Let us simply overwhelm them with contempt, and pass on, unawed and unintemidated, to the declarations of our own hon at opi none, and to the assecion and ex-reise of our rights as treemen [Apiliuse] Let us imitate the example of our own noble caudioate, whose quiet endurance of injustice and calumny has been one of the most beautiful illustrations of his character, and has won for him a respect which will outlive the ephone ral notoriety of his revilers. Our country calls at this moment for the best thoughts, the braves counsels the freest utterances, the most unhesitating devotion of every one of her sons. Let us compare our opinious with rach other honestly, independently, fearlessly; and let no man shrink from following his own conscientious convictions, wherever they may lead him.

THE MOMENTOUS ISSUE AT STAKE. It may be a misfortune, fellow-cit zens, that a new elec-

tion of our national rulers should have come upon us pre-cisely at this moment. We would all gladly keep our eyes wavers upon yonder battle fields. follow its gallant supporters, in the conflicts in which they are engaged, with undivided and uninterrupted sympathies. But it is not in our power to postpone the time appointed for our great political struggle. The Constitution of the United States has fixed that time unalterably and nothing remains for us but to discharge our duties as intelligent and responsible citizens. A great, a tremendous responsibility certainly is upon us. When the votes of the people of the United States—your votes and mine among toem—shall have once decided the question, by what party and upon what principles and policy the National Government shall inistered for the next four years, they will have determined, under God, the destinies of our country for unborn generations. No one in he senses can deubt that the results of the Administration of the next four years will be decisive of the fate of this Bepublic Within that period the Uni n is to be saved or lost. Within that period the Constitution is to be vindicated or overthrown in that period the old flag of our fathers is to be re-advanced in triumph over all the States of which it has ever been, or ever borne, the emblem; or, rent is twam and shorn of half its lustre, it is to droop over a divided land. If the stake of the impending contest, my friends, were any thing less than this, if any thing less or any thing other than the rescue of the Union and the salvation of the Republic were to be the result of this election, we might well hesitate about entering into a political struggle and arraying ourselves against an existing Administration in a time of civil war. But with such an issue of national life or national death before us, there ought to be, there can be, no hesitation on the part of any patriolic citizen. Every one of us, young and old, is called upon by considerations from which there can be no appeal, by obligations from which there can be no escape, to form a careful, dispassionate, conscientious opinion as to his own in lyidual duty, and then to perform that duty without flinching or faltering. We may be pardoned for an honest mistake. We may be execused for an error of judgment. But we can never be excused, before men or beiers God, for standing neutral and doing nothing. There is no exemption from this warfare Not only should it be written on every man's forebend what he thinks of the Republic; but no man should give sleep to his eyes or slumber to his eyelids without asking himself: What can I do for my count y? How can I exercise that most precious of all privileges, that greatest of all rights, the elective franchise, in a way ue her from the dangers by which she is encompassed ? [Applause.] GRATITUDE FOR VICTORIES

And now, my fren a, the first emotion which belon 78 to these occasions of assembling ourselves together, and the one to which we are all and always most eager to give expression, is that of J y and gladness and graticude for the signal successes which have been recently vouchsaled to our arms [Cheers] Most signal they cortainly have Gen. McCieliau was promulgated at Chicago, [toud observe] the military aspect of our affairs has been g eatly im proved. The galant Sherman, at Atlanta, [hee.s.] and the daring and usshing Sheridan, in the Sheuandonh Valley, [cheers,] have schieved victories of vital importance to the cause of the Union; and most heartly would we unite with our fellow citizens of all parties in paying a wellearned tribute of respect and as invalid to the c musseders and to the soldiers who have been instrumental in accomplishing these glotious results. [Applause.] We are told, indeed, that all these victories are impairing the prospects of our own political success, and d minishing the chances of Gen. McCledan's election to the Freedency. Laughter] But we rejoice in them all notwithstanding, and thank God for them with undivided hearts. [" Yes yes."] The more of them the better, whatever the r influence on the election before us. to be so defeated-if that be their is giamate, or ever their illegitimate, result-we are more than content. I venture to say that our noble candidate would rejuce as heartly as President Lincoln himself at every success of our arms. electoral vote. He had rather see his constru rescued, than to secure the highest honor for himself which it is in the power of man to be stow. Let us congratulate him, and let us congratulate esca other-for wo have a right so to do-that his nomination has roused army has been spurred on to redeem the failures of the civil policy of the Administration. [Cheers] The supporters of Gen. McClellan may went be satt-fled-evel should they accomplish nothing more-with having given an impulse to the prosecution of the war, which not only affords the best promise of military success in the intu.e, but which has already given so glorious an earnest of the

fulfilment of that promise. [Continued on the fourth page.]